I use https://mycorrhiza.wiki/. It is really lightweight and stores data in a git repo. So it is terribly easy to export and backup it. the only drawback is that it uses its own markdown dialect

It was a huge codebase in c# with a single file in VB.net with a comment at the top “copied from codinghorrors.com/…”. I never dared to try understanding what that file was supposed to do and why nobody bothered converting it in c#

I have an initramfs script which knows half decription key and fetches the other half from internet.

My threat model is: I want to be able to dispose safely my drives, and if someone steals my NAS needs to connect it to a similar network of mine (same gateway and subnet) before I delete the second half of the key to get my data.

How frequently do you send these updates? Most of dynDNS provider rate limit the updates you can send, so it is possible that you send a bunch of useless updates when the IP didn’t change and the actual update that is required gets discarded because you hit the limit.

Do you log your script errors somewhere? Are you sure that the IP changes so frequently?

I know at least 3 European fiber providers which offers static IPs. For broadband always on connections IP changes should be pretty rare

It is not just a matter of how many ports are open. It is about the attack surface. You can have a single 443 open with the best reverse proxy, but if you have a crappy app behind which allows remote code execution you are fucked no matter what.

Each port open exposes one or more services on internet. You have to decide how much you trust each of these services to be secure and how much you trust your password.

While we can agree that SSH is a very safe service, if you allow password login for root and the password is “root” the first scanner that passes will get control of your server.

As other mentioned, having everything behind a vpn is the best way to reduce the attack surface: vpn software is usually written with safety in mind so you reduce the risk of zero days attacks. Also many vpn use certificates to authenticate the user, making guessing access virtually impossible.

I have automated it with a small initramfs script which has half password and download the other half from internet. My threat model is to protect from a random thief. So they should connect it to a network similar to mine (same netmask and gateway) and boot it before I can remove the half key from internet.

some security which is on my TODO list is: allow fetching the half key only from my home IP and add some sort of alert for when it is fetched.

The really important things (essentially only photos) are backed up on a different USB drive and remotely on backblaze. Around one terabyte cost 2-3$ per month (you pay by operation, so it depends also by how frequently you trigger the backup). You want to search for “cold storage” which is the name for cloud storage unfrequently accessed (in other words, more storage than bandwidth). As a bonus, if you use rclone you can encrypt your data before sending it to the cloud.

Backup and encryption. encryption prevents the thief to see my data, backup allows me to make a new server. Furthermore, as other pointed out, I don’t expect that a common thief will see a lot of value in a small black box on top of a shelf

I remember reading a post on mastodon where it was explained that no mother board validates the secure boot keys expiration dates otherwise it wouldn’t boot the first time the BIOS battery gets empty and the internal clock gets reset. The post was written well and was citing some sources. But I didn’t try to verify these assertions.

I’m not familiar with this setup. But do you want for the server to boot as soon as it receive any packet addressed to its IP?

You need to send the WOL packet to the broadcast address of your network, not to the machine IP address. It this way all the machines on the network will receive it, including the ones that have been powered off for a while

Just use the directory listing of your favourite web server. You have a HTTP read only view of a directory and all of its content. If you self host likely you have already a reverse proxy, so it is just matter of updating its configuration. I’m sure it is supported by Apache, Nginx, LightHttpd, and Caddy. But I would expect every webserver supports it. Caddy is the easiest to use if you need to start from scratch.

I use filestash. I like it because it can connect with so many backends. In my setup it uses samba behind the scenes all the shares permissions are in a single configuration and I don’t have to worry about a different set of user credentials.

I’d say that the most important takeover of this approach is to stop all the containers before the backup. Some applications (like databases) are extremely sensitive to data corruption. If you simply ´cp´ while they are running you may copy files of the same program at different point in time and get a corrupted backup. It is also important mentioning that a backup is good only if you verify that you can restore it. There are so many issues you can discover the first time you recover a backup, you want to be sure you discover them when you still have the original data.

Good point, I’ll add it on my TODO list

The decryption key is more than 20 random character, so if you get only half of it is not a biggie and it doesn’t look like anything interesting.

It is on the internet mostly because I don’t have anything else to host it locally. But I see some benefit: I wanted for the server to be available immediately after a power failure. If it fetches the key from internet I just need for the router to be online, if it fetches it from the local network I need another server running unencrypted disk.

Linux from chromebook is just a configuration you enable from the settings menu. If offers you a shell which is similar to a Ubuntu and you can install standard Linux software using the “apt install” command. Said so, if they cannot even install chrome extensions this is likely disabled too.

Second reason. It may run your vpn, with the server down you cannot connect to it and provide the decryption key unless you are connected to the same network.

There are some good answer around where the server can easily decrypt automatically as long as it is connected in your home but will likely fail at a thief’s home. These are a much safer setup than keeping data unencrypted even if they are not bullet proof.

The issue I see with TPM is that it will always unlock the drive as long as it is connected to the same motherboard. It means you have to trust all the services you run to be correctly secured. Like there is little reason to encrypt your hard drive in this way if later you have a samba share open without any password.

I’ve configured something similar. The /boot partition is the only unencrypted. In the initramfs there is a script that downloads half of the decryption key from http, while the other half is stored in the script itself. The script implements automated retry until it can fetch the key and decrypt the root partition.

My attack model here is that, as soon as I realize someone stole my NAS I can shutdown the server hosting half of the decryption key making my data safe. There is a window where the attacker could connect it to a network and decrypt the data, but it is made more difficult by the static network configuration: they should have a default gateway with the same IP address of mine.

On my TODO list I also have to implement some sort of notification to get an alert when the decryption key is fetched from internet.